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INSURING RELIABLE FACT FINDING IN GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: WHY NOT REAL EVIDENCE RULES?
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT"
I am honored to comment on Judge Becker's article. My few
words of praise about his contributions to evidence law cannot do him
justice. He is a preeminent jurist whose opinions have immensely
advanced the law in this area.1 He is a scholar advocating evidence
reform, as his recent article with Professor Orenstein in the George
Washington Law Review indicates. 2 I certainly do not stand alone in
saying that he has helped my thinking and, more important, our law
immeasurably. A better choice for the Sullivan Lecturer is hard to
imagine.
He continues his march on cutting edge evidentiary issues by
examination of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines,
as he explains, are a fact-driven process.' Amazingly in a country
supposedly committed to procedural justice, little thought was given to
how those facts were to be determined, except for the decision that the
proceedings would not be bound by trial evidence rules.4 Decisions
have been made based upon hearsay and hearsay upon hearsay and
hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay. Anonymous accusers, often
hidden further by a faceless facade of other absent declarants, have
caused citizens allegedly protected by our Constitution to spend years
in jail.
Judge Becker urges reform in how evidence is presented and
developed at the fact-finding hearings iinder the Federal Sentencing
Copyright © 1993, Randolph N. Jonakait
*Professor of Law, The New York Law School. A.B. 1967, Princeton
University; J.D. 1970, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1971, New York University.
L See such opinions as United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985) (scientific evidence); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (hearsay exceptions), rev'd in part and affd in
part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The FederalRules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "PlainMeaning"Jurisprudence,the Need for
an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 Gso. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992).
3. "[S]entencing under the Guidelines is a thoroughly fact-driven process.
The judge is required to find the facts demanded by the above described
framework, and these facts, for the most part, virtually mandate or at least
dominate the sentencing decision." Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact
FindingIn Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation
and Due ProcessClauses Be Applied?, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 1,8 (1993).
4. Id. at 2-3.
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Guidelines.
He would create an "unfairness index".
The
sentencing judge would first determine whether the traditionally
inadmissible hearsay is important to the facts to be determined. If so,
[T]he court, using the flexible concept of due process, would
consider alternative procedures to convert hearsay into
reliable fact ....

If the unfairness index remains high after

consideration of other devices, then the court should require
the government to produce the declarant so that he or she may
be subject to cross-examination. If this proves impossible, I
recommend that the court increase the burden of proof on the
government for aggravating factors to a clear and
convincing standard. 5
Judge Becker's proposal does a service. It does this first by simply
focusing attention on fact finding outside of trials. Volumes have
been written about the evidentiary procedures at trials, but little has
been written about the procedures used at sentencing, 6 even though fact
finding at sentencing affects more defendants than fact finding at
trial. As Judge Becker notes, eighty-three percent of the people
sentenced in federal court have not had a trial.7
The Judge's proposal also serves, of course, not just by focusing on
fact finding at sentencing, but by offering improvements for that
process. Fact finding under the Guidelines is crucial. Wrong
sentencing resolutions cause injustice. Surely, the Judge is right; if
we enrich the quality of evidence at the sentencing hearing, we will
improve the accuracy of determinations based on that evidence.'
Judge Becker's reform is important also because, unlike many
professorial proposals, it does not advocate the unattainable. Reform
based on due process, as is the Judge's suggestion, is more likely to
5. Id. at 23-24. Judge Becker's alternative devices to transform hearsay
into reliable fact include the production of documents from government files,
procurement of affidavits, stipulations, and depositions, including telephone
depositions. Id. at 4-5.
6. Cf Randolph N. Jonakait, Making the Law of FactualDeterminations

MatterMore, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 673, 688 (1992) ("Evidence law is only a small
part of the much larger fact-determination system. In comparison to its limited
role, too much time is spent debating evidence law. As a result, evidentiary
doctrine seems much more important than it is.").
7. Becker, supra note 3, at 8 n.21.
8. Cf. Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved
Verdicts, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 343, 351-52 (1991) ("More accurate and complete

'facts' will lead to more accurate results no matter how that evidence is
assimilated and assessed.").

1993]

WHY NOT REAL EVIDENCE RULES?

succeed than one based on confrontation. The Supreme Court has
given no indication that it will extend the confrontation right to
sentencing. 9 Furthermore, the Court has increasingly used due
9. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), where, in a case
preceding the incorporation of the Confrontation Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court rejected a due process challenge to the use of hearsay at
sentencing. See Becker, supra note 3, at 6 for a discussion of Williams. See also
id. at 3 ("With respect to confrontation, every court of appeals to deal with the
problem has held that confrontation rights do not apply at the sentencing
stage.").
Interpreters, however, who rely on the plain meaning of the text of the
Constitution might have to conclude differently. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. C oNsT. amend. VI.
Part of this language plainly grants the accused protections only for a
"trial". Thus, "by an impartial jury" refers to the preceding "trial", as do the
qualifiers "speedy and public". As a matter of purely textual analysis, however,
the assistance of counsel guarantee does not refer to "trial". Instead, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." The right to counsel applies not to the limited notion
of "trial", but to the phrase "all criminal prosecutions." And, of course, the right
to counsel extends beyond trials to all critical stages of a prosecution, including
sentencing. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment's text does not limit the confrontation right to trials, but to all
criminal prosecutions. A purely textual analysis, then, should grant the right to
confrontation whenever the right to counsel has been granted.
Cf. Note, An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1888 (1992) [hereinafter Harvard Note]:
The plain meaning of the [Sixth Amendment's] words, however,
suggests that "criminal prosecutions" include sentencing. More
significantly, the original meaning of "criminal prosecutions" likely
included determination of the appropriate penalty. At the time of the
framing of the Sixth Amendment, trial and sentencing were not distinct;
conviction for a particular crime almost automatically led to the
imposition of a legislatively-prescribed punishment.
Icd. at 1888.
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process standards to measure possible constitutional violations even
when Sixth Amendment protections clearly apply."0 Judge Becker's
analysis, resting on fundamental fairness, is much more likely to be
persuasive in today's world than one based on the Sixth Amendment.
While the Judge's proposal could improve the fairness and
accuracy of sentencing and possibly be adopted, it is not without
drawbacks. For example, the Judge expects that his procedures would
not impose an undue burden on our system because it would only
apply to a fragment of federal sentencing decisions.
Most cases are quite straightforward; in these cases the
sentence will flow primarily from the facts of conviction ....
[T]he proposals that I make will apply only to those cases
where an adverse resolution of a disputed fact will affect the
defendant's sentence. And even then, it will not always be
necessary
for the court to jump through all the various
1
"hoops."
While the "unfairness index" hearings might impose burdens in
a relatively small number of cases, the mere uncertainty caused by
such hearings will produce a more significant burden. Without
definite evidentiary rules, but with the chance declarants will have to
be produced, the prosecutor in each case will have to assess whether
witnesses need to be kept on tap for sentencing. While the judicial
perspective might be different, attorneys find a system burdensome
where they cannot reasonably predict what proof wiHl be allowed. 2
10. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Foreword: Notes for a Meaningful and
Consistent Sixth Amendment, 82 J. C RIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 713 (1992) ("A

strain of Supreme Court reasoning uses a due process analysis to decide Sixth
Amendment claims. This approach deprives Sixth Amendment guarantees of
independent meaning and makes them superfluous."). Cf. Becker, supra note 3,
at 20. ("In its procedural aspect, the Due Process Clause subsumes confrontation
values, and provides more case specific flexibility.").
11. Becker, supra note 3, at 21.
12. For example, the present residual hearsay exceptions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), were opposed because
attorneys could not reasonably predict in advance of trial what hearsay would

be allowed. Thus, the House of Representatives eliminated them from the
proposed rules, explaining, "The [House Judiciary] Committee deleted these
provisions ... as injecting too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and
impairing the ability of practitioners to prepare for trial." H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7079. The residual

exceptions were only enacted after they were amended to include a provision
requiring a party to give advance notice of the intention to use the provisions.
For the legislative history of the residual hearsay provisions, see Randolph N.
(continued)
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The diligent prosecutor will always have to assume the worst case
scenario and make sure that possible witnesses are available until
after the hearing. This would lead to more work than Judge Becker
acknowledges.
Even if they ultimately are not produced, the
prosecutor will have to keep track of numerous people whose
appearances might be ordered.
The Supreme Court, as its
confrontation reasoning indicates, at least would see that as a
"significant practical burden on the prosecution."'"
More troubling dangers, however, lurk in the case by case system
proposed by the Judge. Its ad hoc nature would inevitably lead to
disparate treatment as different judges would decide in different
ways what evidence was necessary. Federal judges already evince a
wide range of views over the wisdom of the present trial hearsay
rules. 14 Judge Becker's system, which really says, "Do what you
think is best, trial judge", would, in effect, give free reign to each
judge's opinion about the present hearsay rule without a guarantee
that this individualistic opinion stay consistent among the cases that
each judge decides. Perhaps this is the road to better justice, but it is
one paved more with the rule of men and women than the rule of law.
Judge Becker's proposal would not meaningfully cabin judicial
discretion although his reform, I am willing to bet, would be opposed
by many federal judges as an unnecessary restriction on their
Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule:

The Residual Hearsay

Exceptions, CircumstantialGuarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury

Testimony, 36 CAsE W. R ES. L. REv. 431, 437-41 (1986).
13. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 (1986). The Supreme Court, in
rejecting that the Confrontation Clause requires that the declarant must be
unavailable in order for coconspirator statements from absent, declarants to be
used against an accused, stressed the burden that such a requirement would
place on the prosecution:
In every case involving coconspirator statements, the prosecution
would be required to identify with specificity each declarant, locate
those declarants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing
availability for trial. . . . For unincarcerated declarants the
unavailability rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy
period before trial the Government must endeavor to be aware of the
whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court determination
that its efforts to produce the declarant did not satisfy the test of"good
faith".
Id.
14. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished
De Facto by JudicialDecision?, 76 MiNN. L. REV. 473 (1992), for a study of how
judges actually apply the hearsay exceptions.
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discretion. How much freedom should judges have in devising the
procedures for determining facts at Guidelines sentencing? The
Guidelines themselves are schizophrenic over the wisdom of wide
judicial discretion.15 On the one hand, the chief motivation behind the
Guidelines was to reduce sentencing disparities by restricting
judicial discretion to set a sentence. On the other hand, trial judges
were basically granted unfettered discretion in deciding how the
disputed facts were to be determined in this newly created, fact-driven
process.16
I am saying nothing subversive in stating that we ought to be
concerned about discretionary powers ceded to judges. That concern
helped animate our Bill of Rights; certainly it was at heart of the
Sixth Amendment. At least when it came to trials, the framers
wanted juries to find facts, not judges, and so the right to jury trials
was constitutionalized. The framers wanted to make sure that
defense advocates, not judges, could develop the information upon
which juries would act, and so they constitutionalized the rights to
counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process.
Times change, of course, but modern attorneys are not being
disrespectful to the judiciary when they resist judicial control of the
process by which facts are developed. Many would take the wise
counsel of Senator Sam Ervin, who after recognizing that "some
judges do not have the discretion that others do," concluded, during
hearings on the then proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, that he
"would rather have the rules say what is admissible rather than
discretionary. "17

Judge Becker's proposal, in a slightly different form, just
continues to allow the trial judge to determine what procedures should
be used to determine facts at Guidelines sentencing. His reform
would not meaningfully restrict judicial discretion. It, however,
would require judges to be more self-reflective about the fairness of
15. See Becker, supra note 3, at 1 ("The United States Sentencing
Guidelines . . . were designed primarily to eliminate the serious and
longstanding problem of similarly situated offenders receiving widely disparate
punishments .... [Tihey have been attacked for unacceptably limiting the
discretion of sentencing judges.").
16. See Jonakait, supra note 10, at 742-43. ("Whether they are labeled
adversary rights or the rights of the advocate; whether they were seen as a
counter balance to the prosecutor or a restraint on judicial authority; the Sixth
Amendment granted the accused rights so that the accused could inform the
jury from the accused's perspective of the facts and arguments concerning the
charges.").
17. Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1973).
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the procedures that they employ. Self-reflection can lead to a better
process, 8 but it has limits, as the Guidelines regime indicates.
Trial judges now have every power that Judge Becker's proposal
would give them. They can, and they must, now reject any hearsay
that is unreliable. 9 They can now insist that evidence take a more
reliable form. Will they exercise these existing powers more if they
contemplate an unfairness index? Perhaps, but also remember that
judges have not just allowed hearsay of four and five levels to be
considered at the sentencing hearings, they have been convinced by
these pick-up-sticks-like edifices. Judges who now accept that facts
are proven on such evidence obviously do not consider such
proceedings unfair. Why should a more formal unfairness hearing
change this situation?

18. At least this seems to be a dominant theory behind 'lawyering" theory.
Instructors have faith that if students are taught to be more reflective about their
performances as simulated attorneys, they will eventually be better attorneys
and the legal system will improve as a result. Some common sense, but little
empirical data, supports these suppositions.
19. The Guidelines, in prescribing how disputed facts are to be determined,
state, "In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without
regard to its admissibility under the Rules of Evidence applicable at trial,
provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1992) (emphasis added). The grant of

authority here is discretionary, not mandatory. The judge does not have to
consider all hearsay of the sort not admissible at trial even if that hearsay has
indicia of reliability. The judge merely may consider such information.
On the other hand, the judge may consider such data only if it "has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Using the plain
meaning of the chosen words, this means something much different from the
definition of relevance in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Information is relevant
under the Rules if the information makes a material issue more probable or less
probable. FED. R. EvID. 401. No matter how slight the shift in the probabilities,
the information is relevant as long as there is some movement in the odds. The
Guidelines do not authorize a court to consider information otherwise
inadmissible at trial as long as it is relevant in this evidentiary sense, that is, as
long as it shifts, even though only slightly, the probabilities on an issue material
to sentencing. Instead, there has to be indicia of reliability to assure that the
information is probably accurate. In ordinary English, saying that something is
probably accurate means that it is more likely than not that it is true or correct.
Merely concluding that information has minimal indicia of reliability may be
enough to satisfy due process, but it is not sufficient to satisfy the clear language
of the Guidelines. Cf. Becker, supra note 3, at 10 ("The caselaw generally holds
that the minimal reliability standard is sufficient to satisfy due process.").
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Even if, however, Judge Becker's proposal would reform judicial
behavior, a more basic question should be confronted. Should the limit
Due process only prevents
of our concern be due process?
fundamental unfairness. As the Judge states, "Undergirding my
approach is the view that due process is a flexible concept, the purpose
of which is to assess and remediate fundamentally unfair
Should our goal be only to displace elemental
procedures.
injustices when we are devising procedures that determine the most
basic, cherished liberty of freedom? Should not we strive instead for
the procedures that will bring us the most accuracy in the factual
resolutions?
This leads to another question. Why not apply real law to the
Guidelines sentencing hearings determining issues about the
defendant's criminal involvement; why not apply the Federal Rules
of Evidence?
This question does have an answer. Federal Rule of Evidence
1101(d)(3) expressly states that the Rules do not apply in sentencing
proceedings. 21 In looking at the wisdom of this prohibition, however,
we should focus on Rule 102, entitled Purpose and Construction:
"These Rules shall be construed ...

to the end that the truth may be

22
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
We have the rules of evidence because we believe that they are the
best devices in our system for the divination of truth and for just
determinations. If these rules serve their goals for trials, how can
If these rules do not work for trials,
they be ignored at sentencing?
2
why do we have them?

20.

Becker, supra note 3, at 24.

21. "The [Federal Rules of Evidence] (other than with respect to privileges)
do not apply in the following situations: .. . sentencing ...

."

FED. R. EVID.

1101(d)(3).
22. FED R. EVID. 102.
23. Surely, however, the rules of evidence do aid the accurate
determination of truth or the work of many intelligent people has been in vain.
Although evidence law may have subsidiary purposes, its prime goal is
to advance the accuracy of the courts' fact finding function.... Our
present evidence law is the product of common law generations, study

by legal giants, many reform efforts, and much recent codification
guided by scholars, judges, attorneys, and legislators. These efforts
have been undertaken to strengthen the truth-determining process of
trials. While disputes about certain provisions may occur, any rule that
has survived all this evidentiary analysis can be thought to serve the
purpose of making verdicts more accurate.
Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 577-78 (1988).
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One answer, and perhaps the correct one, is that we simply do not
care as much about accurate and fair fact determinations at
sentencing as we do at trials. If there really is value in selfreflection, perhaps we ought to admit this when we discuss the
desirable procedures for sentencing.
Another answer, however, might state that we use different
evidentiary procedures under the Guidelines because factual
determinations at sentencing are fundamentally different from trial
decisions. That may have once been true. As Judge Becker describes,
a "medical model" previously dominated sentencing. 24 This was a
forward looking system. A trial court was trying to predict the future
in determining what was the best sentence to reform or rehabilitate
the accused. This determination was different from the ones made at
normal trials. Criminal trial verdicts do not look forward. They
look backward to try to determine what happened at some time in the
past.
But, of course, as Judge Becker has explained, the Guidelines
factual determinations do not follow the medical model.2 5 The
Guidelines decisions are backward looking. They attempt to punish
a defendant for the full extent of his past criminal behavior relating to
the convicted charge. When the sentencing judge assesses the "real
offense", the judge is making the same sort of factual determinations

24. The philosophy underpinning this system of indeterminate
punishment was the so-called "medical model," which posited that
convicted defendants could (and should) be rehabilitated, and that
rehabilitation should be taken into account in fixing the sentence, along with
the other generally accepted purposes of sentencing-deterrence, protection
of society, and retribution.
Becker, supra note 3, at 5.
25. See Becker, supra note 3, for a summary of the Guidelines sentencing
scheme. See also Becker & Orenstein, supra note 2, at 887-88:
Under the new regime [of the Guidelines], the sentence is shaped and, in
many respects, driven by the trial court's factual findings, particularly
the findings that relate to relevant offense conduct not included in the
conviction itself. The finding of other nonconviction but related
conduct can raise the base offense level .... In contrast with the preGuidelines regime ... the judge is not free to compromise by reducing
the sentence in proportion to the degree of persuasiveness of the
evidence bearing on the sentencing factors.
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that have been traditionally made at criminal trials-whether
certain historical events occurred. Was the defendant the leader of
the criminal activity? Did the defendant sell other drugs besides the
ones he was convicted of? And so on. If we ask such questions in a
criminal trial, which we do every day, we use the rules of evidence to
answer them because those rules are the best ones, we believe, to reach
the truth. What makes placing those same questions into the
sentencing framework so much different that those rules no longer do
the job for assessing truth? Perhaps most directly to the point, how can
we recoil from such information as multi-level hearsay at trial and
embrace it at sentencing?26 Why should there be any difference in the
27
evidentiary procedures when the same sorts of facts are at stake?
The reply might simply be costs. It would take too much in time
and money and effort to use real evidence rules at sentencing. 2 As
26. The recent en banc decision by the Sixth Circuit illustrates these
questions. The trial court had determined that the accused had been involved in
a quarter gram drug sale. At sentencing, the issue was whether the defendant
had taken part in earlier sales and, if so, how big they were. The dissent
summarized how the crucial information got to the sentencing court:
[An unnamed informant tells a police officer, who tells the police chief,
who tells a DEA agent, who tells a probation officer, who tells the court,
that Silverman was a major dealer in drugs.... The amount of drugs in
prior unconvicted transactions is then estimated by the probation
officer and Silverman's sentence is automatically increased more than
five years based on the quintuple hearsay of witnesses who no one
suggests were unavailable.
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1520 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merrit, J.,
dissenting).
27. We might also ask, why not apply confrontation principles to these
factual decisions? The Supreme Court has stated that "the Confrontation
Clause's very mission [is] to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials."' Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985)
(quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)). The right to confrontation, in
other words, furthers truth when we want to determine whether a person
committed a crime. How, then, can we not use the same procedures when we
determine whether a person committed a crime for purposes of sentencing?
28. Cf Becker, supra note 3, at 20:
I believe, however, that it will not be wise to mandate the full
application of the Confrontation Clause ... to Guidelines Sentencing.
My concerns are primarily administrative. There are many thousands
of Sentencing Guidelines cases decided every year and probably many
hundreds of opinions addressing the sufficiency of procedures. Given
(continued)
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Judge Becker states, however, the number of instances where the
sentence depends upon the disputed determination of the defendant's
other criminal activities is small.2 9 Indeed, it may be more efficient
to just apply the evidence rules, which allow attorneys to predict
reasonably what witnesses will be necessary, to this modest segment
of sentencing decisions than to go through the separate unfairness
hearings that the Judge proposes. In any event, if the rules of evidence
are our best device for resolving disputed questions about possible
criminal events, then those who wish to abandon them at least ought to
show, and not just assert, that the costs associated with them are too
burdensome to be borne.'
Perhaps there are principled as well as simply historical answers
(that is the way it has always been done) as to why we do not use real
evidence rules at sentencing, but in searching for them, I suggest that
we face other questions, ones based on even less formed ideas than my
previous questions.
Criminal procedure, I believe, is set off from the rest of the law.
For example, the standards measuring the constitutionality of
the current linkage between the confrontation and evidence
jurisprudence, I believe that application of confrontation law to these
myriad cases would lead to a hodgepodge that would ill serve the
development of the jurisprudence of both confrontation and evidence.
Id
29. See supratext accompanying note 11. See also Becker, supra note 3, at
28-29 n.120:
While I recognize that there is much concern that the additional time
consumed by Guidelines Sentencing has imposed a burden on already
overburdened district and magistrate judges, preliminary data
available from the Federal Judicial Center, based on pre- and postGuidelines district court time studies, suggests that the amount of time
spent on Guideline Sentencing hearings is only 25% greater than was
spent on pre-Guidelines hearings.
Id
30. An honest assessment of burdens and costs might show that the
evidence rules would not exact an exorbitant amount of time and money. The
truly important costs might be the abandonment of the use of information from
informers who would not be allowed to remain anonymous. Cf Harvard Note,
supra note 9, at 1896 ("Part of this burden relates to the use of confidential
informants for sentencing information. Giving the defendant the right to
confront confidential witnesses would enable him to learn their identities: the
government would thus be forced either not to use such witnesses or to expose
them to potential retaliation.").
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criminal procedures are often different from those used in
interpreting other constitutional provisions."' Why is a "strict
scrutiny", a "compelling state interest", or a "least restrictive
alternative" test used to decide some constitutional disputes, but not
those concerning the rights of those facing criminal charges?32 The
law's web may be seamless, but it has a rent which isolates criminal
procedure.
If the insularity of criminal procedure were stripped away and we
examined it through the devices by which we review other areas of the
law, we might see that, while our rhetoric proclaims great rights for
the criminal defendant, the criminal defendant is often treated more
shabbily and afforded fewer protections in many ways than any other
party who comes into court. We do grant the accused proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, a right against self-incrimination, and a valuable
double jeopardy protection, but we then set up rules and procedures
weighted against the accused in ways that would not be tolerated
elsewhere. Discovery fits this description, as Professor Gianelli's
article in this symposium illustrates."3 And so, of course, does
sentencing. 34
31. Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to
a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1056 (1987) ("For reasons that are not
apparent, the field of constitutional criminal procedure has not always
incorporated the modes of analysis generally employed in constitutional
cases.").
32. Cf. Jonakait, supra note 10, at 729:
If this [Sixth Amendment impartial juror] right is fundamental, should
it be measured by standards different from those by which other
essential guarantees are measured? The crucial issue might be whether
a "strict scrutiny," or "compelling state interest," or a "least restrictive
alternative" test should be used to decide Sixth Amendment disputes
just as such formulations are used to assess other constitutional claims.
33. Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the ConfrontationClause, 22
U. L. REV. 45 (1993).
34. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 also indicates how we often treat
criminal cases apart from the rest of the law. This provision states that the
Federal Rules of Evidence "apply generally to civil actions and proceedings,
including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and proceedings, to
contempt proceedings except those in which the court may act summarily, and
to proceedings and cases under title 11, United States Code." FED. R. EVID.
1101(b). The Rule then goes on, however, to state that the "rules (other than
with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations .... " FED. R.
EVID. 1101(d). The first exception is for preliminary questions of fact to be
(continued)
CAP.
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These thoughts suggest that we examine the Guidelines from a
broadened perspective. We now compare sentencing to a criminal
trial, cite the differences, and justify the procedural differences
undercutting the accused at the punishment proceeding. But if we see
ourselves as having one legal system, we would not examine
sentencing procedures by themselves or only compare them to
criminal trials.3" We would also compare and contrast them with

determined by the trial court under Rule 104. The second exception is for grand
jury proceedings, and the final exception excludes "[piroceedings for extradition
or rendition; preliminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting
or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses,
and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise." Id
These exceptions in essence exclude the application of the Rules of Evidence
from all parts of a criminal proceeding except the trial. Criminal proceedings,
then, are treated much differently from civil proceedings where the evidentiary
rules apply to all parts of a civil case.
35. A comparison of sentencing and criminal trials, however, raises
questions for me about one particular part of Judge Becker's proposal. He
suggests that if the unfairness index remains high after remedies are explored to
make the information more reliable, then the government should be ordered to
produce the declarants for cross-examination. If this cannot be done, however,
he does not recommend abandonment of the information. Instead, he suggests
"that the court increase the burden of proof on the government for aggravating
factors to a clear and convincing standard." Becker, supra note 3, at 36. Are the
problems inherent in the use of unreliable information that is not cross-

examined taken care of by increasing the burden of proof? That is not the way
we see trials. If it would be, then the prosecutor in a criminal case would have
the right to have evidence admitted that would not be admitted in civil trials.
Not because of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. (That is not the
way the evidence rules operate.) We do not see a heightened burden of proof as
a corrective for unreliable evidence in trials. Why should the burden of proof
serve such a function for sentencing? Cf. Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the
Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and
Hearsay and the Need For an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 96

(1992):
Reliance on a heightened burden of proof, such as a clear and
convincing standard, as the sole means of controlling unreliable proof
at sentencing invites a good deal of subjectivity and inconsistency, the
very characteristics the guidelines were intended to avoid. We know
that individual judges vary considerably in their estimate of the
probabilities represented by a particular standard of proof. In contrast,
a per se evidentiary rule that excludes certain kinds of evidence is more
likely to produce uniform results.
(continued)
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similar civil procedures. Approached this way, the proper point of
comparison for sentencing is not criminal trials, but perhaps the
remedies phase of civil litigation."6 Such an examination raises
further questions that need exploration (and for which I certainly do
not have the answers).
Would we ever use the Guidelines' evidentiary procedures to
determine money damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, or
contempt of injunctive relief? If not, is that by a policy choice? Is there
something about sentencing that sets it apart from other remedies
phases that a less rigorous fact determination process is the best choice
for sentencing? Or would we eschew the Guidelines' procedures in
the civil arena because they would not be constitutional in noncriminal suits? Are there good reasons why they would not be
constitutional in civil cases, but still constitutional in criminal
matters?
I am not sure what such explorations would show, but I do suspect
that, along the way, it would be revealed that the more a proceeding
looks somehow criminal, 7 but is not in fact a criminal trial, the fewer
protections we extend to the defendant. Perhaps, in spite of the rights
we pride ourselves on, when people are seen as criminals, a deep
concern for fairness and truth start heading for the window. Perhaps
that is the reason we have our present fact-finding system under the
Guidelines.

I& at 98.
36. Cf. Becker, supra note 3, at 11-12. "Could one imagine that, after
liability was established in a civil case, the determination of damages, which
bears a rough similarity to sentencing, could be decided under such lax
procedures as are countenanced in the sentencing area? . . . Another useful
analogy is to civil contempt proceedings (following injunctive relief)." Id
37. By this I mean such things as certain immigration matters, forfeitures,
proceedings to confine people with mental difficulties, and so on.

